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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DILEMMAS IN THE 
UMVUMVUMVU CATCHMENT. EASTERN ZIMBABWE
Emmanuel Manzunau ^
Introduction
This paper briefly explores conflict management dilemmas In water allocation 
posed by the absence of effective conflict resolution mechanisms in the 
Umvumvumyu catchment in eastern part of Zimbabwe. Table 1 shows the main 
actors in the catchment with their iegai water entitlements. It is argued that poor 
legislation governing water allocation, the Water Act (1976) No. 41, which does 
not reflect the new political and social realities, has iargely been responsible 
Reduced water flows in the river worsened the problems.
Most of the users in the catchment do not incorporate the provisions of the Act 
into their behaviour. The priority system ’which espouses the principle of first- 
come-first-served in granting water rights and first-come-last-out during periods 
of water scarcity was a major problem. Also, the fact that water rights were 
expressed in absolute terms did not help either. A centralized conflict resolution 
structure located far away (about 400 km) in Harare, the capital city , which 
moreover, was costly, complex and promulgated alien concepts of conflict 
resolution compounded the problem. Further compounding this situation were a 
group of users who, although sharing a common water source, found little 
reason to co-operate. The rigid legal water allocation regime that was not 
matched by flexible water sharing arrangements which recognise natural flow 
variations represented yet another problem.
Of particular concern to this paper are the practicalities regarding the 
decentralization proposals in the water sector. It is government intention to 
devolve management responsibilities to catchment authorities (incorporating 
sub-catchments). This is meant to involve all stakeholders in local management 
of water resources. Under this proposed arrangement the Administrative Court, 
which had soie responsibility of administration of water rights, will cede its 
administrative duties to catchment authorities and will remain a court of appeal. 
It is argued in this paper that while decentralization of water resource 
management is desirable, there is a need to pay particular attention to the 
realities on the ground. One issue that is ‘on the ground' is conflict management 
as conflicts in water sharing are inevitable. To examine this issue the Iegai 
position in the current Water Act is outlined. This is followed by a brief 
documentation of what actually happens on the ground in the Umvumvumvu 
catchment. Lastly some policy implications are outlined.
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Table 1: Umvumvumvu W ater Users and Their Entitlements
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User W ater R ight
Mutambara Mission - water right no. 66, priority 16 March 1916 to
abstract 56 Ips for agricultural purposes
- water right no. 2469, priority date 7 October 1949,
to abstract 3 Ips for agricultural purposes
Mutambara Irrigation 
Scheme
first granted in 1941 with the final grant in 1953. A 
flow of 89 Ips may be abstracted when the flow in the 
river was in excess of 344 Ips, but when the flow was 
less, abstraction was supposed to be 42 Ips.
Mandima Co-operative, 
a model B co-operative
15 Ips when flow is greater than 56 Ips
i
l
j
Shinja Extension, 
model A
«  -  .  .
no water right
.  .  .  i
i Maraisi Co-op j no water right
Source: DWR, Mutare files
Conflict Resolution in the Law
There are two main schools of water allocation in the world, the riparian and 
appropriation doctrines. Zimbabwe's water law is based on the appropriation 
doctrine which is markedly different from the riparian doctrine. The riparian 
doctrine originated in well-watered regions while the appropriation doctrine 
emerged in arid and semi-arid areas (Howe et al. 1986). Under the riparian 
doctrine landowners bordering on a water body (riparian owners) are entitled to 
make reasonable use of water provided the water is retained to the river 
undiminished in quantity and quality. Because of the difficulty of defining what 
constitutes reasonable use and the increasing scarcity of water, the riparian 
doctrine has been changed in favour of the appropriation doctrine in many 
places (Howe et al., 1986). It is important to note that the doctrine was based on 
the assumption that water will not be scarce such that it would limit agricultural 
production. On the other hand, the appropriation doctrine is supposed to be 
based on efficient use of water. There is reference to water being allocated on 
the basis of beneficial use. To ensure beneficial use of water, a water right 
application is required to be accompanied by a demonstration that the water will 
be used efficiently (see Matinenga, 1995) in the form of a document from Agritex 
alongside the hydrological report Once beneficial use is demonstrated, water 
rights are issued in perpetuity on the first-come-first-served and first-in-Iast-out 
basis. This means that the first applicant gets the water and in the face of water
scarcity, the same first applicant gets the water ahead of anyone else. To further 
ensure efficient use of water the applicant is also required to install water 
measuring devices so that water use can be monitored. The Act is not 
concerned with ensuring water availability to vulnerable groups such as 
communal and resettlement farmers. This situation has resulted In social 
tensions, contempt for the iaw, large scale theft and illegal use of water from 
public streams.
Under the current legislation, the state owns all the water. Users get use rights. 
All issues relating to water allocation are under the jurisdiction of the 
Administrative Court. The Court is empowered to hear and determine (a) 
applications for the use of public water made in terms of the W ater Act and (b) 
disputes concerning the abstraction, appropriation, control, diversion or use of 
public water (GOZ, 1976). The centralized nature of conflict resolution is 
illustrated in the statement that 'no court, other than the Administrative Court, 
shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine an application 
or dispute [involving water]'. There are a number of situations where other forms 
of conflict resolution apart from litigation, are mentioned in the Act. Parties 
involved in a dispute can opt for a less rigorous route by writing to the judge and 
asking him to make a decision on the issue. Any award made under this route is 
however just as valid as the normal court process.
Conflict Resolution in Practice
This section looks at problems with regards to water sharing in the catchment 
between the 1993/94 and 1995/6 seasons. The magnitude of problems was 
directly related to the amount of water flowing in the river. Serious problems 
were encountered when the most downstream water user, in this case the 
Scheme, experienced water scarcity. In such cases people from Mutambara 
travelled upstream in search of more water. Events documented by the 
researcher in September 1995 when he went up the river with the Scheme water 
bailiff revealed a lot of problems.
Mutambara Irrigation Scheme versus Mutambara Mission
The Scheme faced a critical water shortage in the 1994/95 season because of 
decreasing river water inflows. This was a consequence of reduced rainfall (in 
the 1990s the flow in the river was below average). During the 1994/5 season 
the shortage culminated in the irrigators in the scheme sleeping with axes at 
their side to safeguard water (this was largely a failure) (Manzungu, 1995).
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The forcefulness of the demands for water by the Scheme varied according to 
the flow in the river When water was low in the river during the 1994/95 season, 
the Scheme people were active in their bid to secure water. The Mission 
disagreed with this view since this would jeopardize their own farming 
operations, oesiues, tne r/nssi on argued that it had senior water rights (see 
below). Faced with this intransigence', the Scheme water bailiff attempted to get 
water down-river by removing the stones at the Mission intake. Mission workers 
in such cases simply put the stones back. In the end the Scheme water bailiff 
resorted to removing the stones at night. The following morning workers from the
Mission would put back the stones, in more than one instance the Mission, 
exasperated by this hide and seek game, deployed its workers to patrol the 
intake during the night to make sure that their intake was not tampered with.
During these encounters the Mission relied on the legal argument of senior 
water rights. On its part the Scheme did not have a copy of the water rights. The 
knowledge that they had about water rights was enough for them to engage in 
serious wrangles with the Mission. The Mission approached the district 
administrator and the local police on more than one occasion but this strategy 
did not work. In all cases the District Administrator tried to arbitrate with no 
success, hence the endless problems. The Mission put the blame on the 
Scheme people "who are illiterate and who do not understand water rights".
Mandima Co-op versus Mutambara Mission
Ever since the Co-op farmers settled, the Mission tried to dissuade them from 
abstracting 'too much water*. The DA was again called to arbitrate. In an 
interview he commented that the Mission tended to be dogmatic about the law 
which did not help matters. The DWR was called in to arbitrate. It ruled in favour 
of the Mission on technicalities of the colonial law. This, however, did not solve 
the problem.
To secure their position, the Co-op farmers enlisted the help of Agritex to obtain 
water rights, a copy of which they received in 1988. Just like the Mission, 
Mandima Co-op farmers did not mind the fine print on the water right which 
stipulated that they were entitled to abstract 15 Ips when the flow in the river is 
greater than 56 Ips and also that the Mission had the priority over water because 
of its older water right. They seemed unable to understand why a population ol 
30G people, with a primary school of all grades, and dependent entirely on 
agriculture, should have less priority over a Mission station that gets external 
funds and also receives school fees from its student population. This case has 
not been resolved.
Mutambara Irrigation Scheme vs. jMutambara Mission,  Mandima Co-op, 
Shinja Extension and Maraisi Co-op
In 1995 the Scheme was up in arms against ail the upstream users who were 
"denying" it water. From time to time the water bailiff went up and talked to the 
users with no success. He opened up the stone barriers but that did not help. 
The upstream users would put back the barriers as soon as he turned his back.
Shinja Extension and Maraisi used the legitimacy argument. W hy would they 
not irrigate when they were occupying lands which used to be Irrigated? The 
other reason was one of livelihood; they needed to survive, in fact Shinja took 
more water equal if not more than every other user despite the fact that they only 
irrigated 35 hectares.
Mandima versus Shinja Extension i
The basic problem between these two was one of ideology. Mandima Co-of 
farmers asserted that they did not want to live like those in Shinja Extension who
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were bothered by a!! the tradition that goes on with living in the “murusevha." 13 
On the other hand, the Shinja farmers blamed the Mandima farmers of 
disrespect for tradition by refusing to contribute towards rainmaking ceremonies. 
This was a cause of poor rains, they asserted. On their part, although refusing to 
acknowledge the authority of the nearby Chief Mutambara, Mandima Co-op 
farmers contributed towards the rainmaking ceremonies under the auspices of 
the Chief. There was ill-feeling between the two to the extent that there was a fist 
fight on one occasion.
Conclusion: Some Policy Issues
It can be observed that dilemmas in conflict management are a result of natural, 
social and legal factors. Below is a summary of the main points contained in the 
paper.
Principle of Water Allocation
Due to the inadequacies in the existing legislation there was a new water 
allocation 'principle' at play in the Umvumvumvu catchmeht: the bulk of the 
water was actually used by 'illegal* users. The inadequacies of legislation 
related to the priority right system which could not be enforced because it 
clashed with what was considered fair, just and equitable by the users. The 
satisfaction of basic needs seemed paramount to the users as evidenced by the 
fact that Mutambara Mission was given a lower priority since it was deemed to 
have other sources of obtaining food for Ihe school children. Moreover, the legal 
requirement that demanded latecomers to give priority to early comers was 
impractical. At any rate, that cut off point was difficult to determine and was not 
locally enforced by the DW R. Clearly the legalities around definition of property 
rights reflected in the concept of water rights, formulated in another political epa, 
failed to be applicable to a new socio-political reality. For example, how could it 
be possible to deny Shinja farmers the right to abstract water for their needs just 
because the original owner did not secure water rights? It seems obvious that a 
new allocation principle is necessary.
The Issue of Basic Needs
Cross-cutting all the disputes in the Umvumvumvu catchment was the issue of 
irrigators' concern to secure their livelihoods. The practical implication is that 
unless the water legislation is seen to address the basic needs of the people 
concerned it is likely to run into problems. It appeared that the concept of 
beneficial use of water ran contrary to the aspirations of many smallholder 
farmers.
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"Reserves”, a term that refers to areas which were reserved for black people during 
colonial times, now referred to as communal areas. The term has persisted with the 
connotation of impoverishment.
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The importance of the Hydrologic Reality
The importance of the hydrologic reality and the existence of conflict need to be 
appreciated as attested by the factthat when the water was plenty there were no 
conflicts. An obvious conclusion is that conflict management arrangements 
conceived in water abundant years may succeed, not on their own merits but on 
'hydrologic luck*. In drought years the arrangements crumble as in the 1994/95 
season when there was a test posed on the conflict management arrangements. 
W ater scarcity is thus the right circumstance to evaluate any conflict 
management arrangements.
Effective Institutions for Effective Conflict Management
The present structures for conflict management are too centralized. Moreover 
the Act espouses culturally unacceptable solutions such as the first-come-first- 
served and the first-in-last-out concepts. Many people respected the riparian 
principle. The definition of property represented by absolute volumes read by 
sophisticated gadgets meant that this was hardly angled towards local resource 
management. Decentralization of water allocation and conflict management 
(this is actually not mentioned in any detail in the proposed reforms) may be a 
better alternative. However, as was shown here, decentralization discour 
needs to engage with the specifics of conflict management. Oft 
decentralization is presented as a panacea. This case has highlighted some 
the pitfalls that decentralization has to avoid. For example, how would o; 
choose representatives to this sub-catchment? If this is based on t» 
representatives per sub-catchment as suggested by Taylor et al. (1996), it 
obvious that other interested parties would be excluded. In other words, th€ 
cannot be an a priori decision on the composition of the catchments. This shot 
be a subject of research. On the same point its also worthwhile to think of h< 
democratic these decentralised bodies can be. If they are constituted on f 
basis of alien/unfamiliar (to small-holder farmers) concepts of water allocate 
using technical or non-vernacular languages then small-holder farmers c 
easily be side-lined.
The Need for Simple Ways of Conflict Management
Another relevant point that needs to be mentioned is the issue of procedures 
conflict management. Matinenga (1995) reported that the current legislation w 
costly for the small-holders to use in seeking redress. This point is relevant 1 
the proposed reforms. If costs are prohibitive then justice would have be< 
denied. That is the reason why there is a need to look at alternative forms 
conflict management which are simple, less cumbersome and inexpensive (s< 
Syme and Fenton, 1993).
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